Letting the briber go free: an experiment on mitigating harassment bribes by Abbink, Klaus et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Letting the briber go free: an experiment
on mitigating harassment bribes
Klaus Abbink and Utteeyo Dasgupta and Lata Gangadharan
and Tarun Jain
Monash University, Franklin and Marshall, Indian School of Business
16. October 2012
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/42176/
MPRA Paper No. 42176, posted 11. November 2012 07:43 UTC
1 	  
 
Letting the Briber Go Free: 
An Experiment on Mitigating Harassment Bribes 
 
 
KLAUS ABBINK*, UTTEEYO DASGUPTA†, LATA GANGADHARAN*, TARUN JAIN‡ 
 
 








This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat 
harassment bribes. Basu (2011) advocates legal immunity for bribe-givers, while 
retaining culpability for bribe-takers. Results from our experiment indicate that 
while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices, weak 
economic incentives for the bribe-giver, or retaliation by bribe-takers can mitigate 
the positive disciplining effect of such an implementation. As a result, asymmetric 
liability on its own may face challenges in the field. 
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1. Introduction 
Bribes (or, speed money) are not limited to situations where a citizen pays them to 
receive contracts or services faster from public officials.1 Often officials demand 
bribes even for delivering citizens their entitled services such as an admission to 
the hospital or a swift approval of a passport. Basu (2011) characterizes the latter 
situation as harassment bribes. In this case although the official cannot deny the 
service legally, he can aggravate delivery or threaten to delay the service to a 
point where it becomes useless to the citizen. As a result even though such bribes 
are non-distortionary, harassment bribes are arguably welfare reducing since they 
need to be paid to receive entitled goods and services (Basu 2011).2 This paper 
examines the impact of different policy scenarios on those who initiate and 
respond to harassment bribes. 
Different countries have taken different legal approaches to curbing 
bribery. While in the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany and India 
the bribe-giver and recipient are both equally culpable and face penalties (we refer 
to this as symmetric liability), prescribed legal punishment for the bribe-giver is 
comparatively mild in China, Japan and Russia (see Engel, Görg and Yu 2012 for 
a discussion). Harassment bribery is reported to be particularly rampant in public 
services. Using data collected over 21 months from an Indian anti-graft website 
(www.ipaidabribe.com), a recent report estimates about half a billion rupees paid 
in bribes to lodge a police complaint or receive land purchase documents, 
marriage certificates, electricity connections, registration documents for home 
purchases and even admissions to preferred colleges. 3  Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index (2004) reports that citizens pay bribes 
in 15 percent of cases when dealing with the health and tax sectors, and in almost 
100 percent of cases when dealing with the courts and the police. The current 
legal environment in many countries, which features symmetric liability for both 
the bribe-giver and receiver, seems to further exacerbate this situation. The typical 
bribe-giver, who is an ordinary citizen, is in a dilemma. When faced with a bribe 
demand from a public official, refusal to pay implies considerable inconvenience 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Since the seminal work by Rose-Ackerman (1978) on corruption, economists have been 
interested in this area (Shleifer and Vishny 1993, Mauro 1995, Bardhan 1997, van Rijkeghem and 
Weder 2001, Rose-Ackerman 2006, Rose-Ackerman and Soreide 2011).  
2 “A novel way to combat corruption: Who to punish”, The Economist, May 5th 2011. 
3 “Rs. 11.42 crore and counting… Is what Bangalore paid in bribes”, The Times of India, June 6th, 
2012. 
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or loss due to a certain delay in receiving the service, while succumbing to bribe-
giving makes her legally culpable should the transaction be discovered.  
To remedy this situation, Basu (2011) suggests a punishment system with 
asymmetric liability, prosecuting and punishing only the public official (bribe-
taker) and imposing no legal liability for the ordinary citizen seeking the service 
(bribe-giver). He hypothesises that offering the citizen legal impunity for whistle-
blowing even if she has paid a bribe can encourage more frequent reporting. This 
in turn should discourage officials from demanding bribes in anticipation of the 
whistle-blowing. Consequently, Basu predicts reduced incidence of harassment 
bribery in equilibrium.4 
Critics of Basu’s proposal argue that legal immunity for bribe-givers 
would make bribe-giving an attractive option and perhaps morally acceptable as 
well. As a result, legalising bribe-giving might in effect increase its incidence 
instead of reducing it (Drèze 2011). From a more practical point, Drèze also 
points out that refunding bribes can be complicated and difficult, if not 
completely impossible as a policy. Another resistence against implementing 
Basu’s proposal is that only a change in culpability might not increase bribe-
reporting on its own in a country festered with feeble prosecution rates and 
notoriously slow delivery of justice. This observation becomes particularly 
important for developing countries such as India. 5  Bribe-givers in this lax 
enforcement environment will be apprehensive of future harassment by the 
official still in office, and refrain from whistle-blowing. 
This paper uses experiments to examine the effectiveness of the proposed 
asymmetric culpability rule in combating harassment bribes. Our experimental 
approach offers an alternative to traditional survey or field data analysis. We 
present a typical harassment bribe scenario in a stylised game played by 
participants in the laboratory. By varying the institutional environment across 
treatments we can identify conditions under which policy measures may or may 
not work. The laboratory allows us to observe corrupt decisions empirically, an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Policymakers in other countries have attempted such asymmetric liability rules in contexts other 
than corruption. For example, the United States outlawed distribution and sale of alcohol during 
the Prohibition era (1920-33), while consumption remained legal. As a result, customers could 
testify against their suppliers, which would have been difficult had consumption also been illegal 
(Miron 1999). Sweden, followed by Iceland and Norway, introduced anti-prostitution laws with a 
similar spirit of asymmetric impunity. 
5 For example, less than 40% of all cases in India where a bribe-taking attempt is investigated lead 
to the official being penalised (National Crime Records Bureau 2010). 
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endeavour that is notoriously difficult in the field since everybody involved in 
such decisions has good reasons to remain silent.  
The effect of leniency programs has previously been studied in the context 
of antitrust policies (Apesteguia et al. 2007; Bigoni et al. 2012). Only recently has 
this idea captured the attention of the anti-corruption literature. Dufwenberg and 
Spagnolo (2011) introduce a theoretical model to evaluate Basu’s proposition of 
asymmetric punishments and propose further modifications to the underlying idea. 
The growing experimental literature on corruption, starting with Abbink et 
al. (2002), deals mainly with collusive bribery, i.e., when citizens and officials 
exchange favours at the cost of the public. Subsequent work uses this basic 
structure to answer corruption related questions and test policy instruments such 
as staff rotation (Abbink 2004), top-down vs. bottom-up monitoring (Serra 2012), 
four-eye principle (Schickora 2011), and the use of bribes to motivate inspections 
(Lowen and Samuel 2012). There has also been research on the impact of framing, 
subject background and culture on behaviour in the context of corruption (Abbink 
and Hennig-Schmidt 2006; Alatas et al. 2009; Barr and Serra 2009; Cameron et al. 
2009; Banuri, Eckel, and Wilson 2011). For surveys relating to the experimental 
literature on corruption see Abbink (2006) or more recently Banuri and Eckel 
(2012) and Serra and Wantchekon (2012).  
The paper most akin to ours is the study by Engel, Görg, and Yu (2011), 
who also compare symmetric versus asymmetric punishment regimes, albeit in 
the context of collusive bribery, i.e., bribes that are paid to obtain a favourable 
service that the briber is not entitled to. In their bribery game a citizen can offer a 
bribe to an official, who can reciprocate by manipulating his decision in the 
citizen’s favour. In this framework the results show that asymmetric punishment 
increases the frequency of corrupt exchanges. However, collusive and harassment 
bribery fundamentally differ from one another. Under symmetric punishment, 
citizen and official both have an interest that their bribe-payment stays undetected. 
Letting the briber go free breaks this common interest. In collusive bribery the 
common interest stems from the exchange of favours, and this common interest 
still exists even if liability is not symmetric anymore. Hence, the results from 
Engel, Görg, and Yu (2011) cannot necessarily be transferred to harassment 
bribes.   
Our paper is novel in several ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first experiment addressing harassment bribery (sometimes called 
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extortionary corruption). Second, in contrast to most of the literature, our 
experimental design helps us examine citizens’ behaviour when faced with a 
distribution of bribe amounts providing a better understanding of decision-making 
in the context of corruption. Finally, the treatments examined in the paper allow 
us to evaluate the impact of monetary and non-monetary factors that can influence 
the propensity for whistle-blowing. 
Our findings provide qualified support for Basu’s asymmetric liability 
scheme. When bribe-giving is legalised, reporting increases and demands for 
bribes decrease; however, Drèze’s concerns are relevant as reporting decreases 
when the official has the option to retaliate. Our results indicate further that 
refunding bribes after prosecution might not be necessary for the success of a 
leniency program – intrinsic motivation is what drives citizens to report. Overall, 
our experimental findings suggest that although asymmetric impunity schemes are 
a promising avenue to consider, they ought to be complemented with other 
measures to have the desired disciplining effect. 
 
2. The Harassment Game 
Consider a simple sequential-decision game between an official and a citizen for 
the delivery of a service that the latter is entitled to. The official is obliged to 
grant the service, but de facto has the discretion to deny it, or delay it indefinitely. 
This gives him the opportunity to demand a bribe for speedy delivery. The citizen 
can refuse to pay, but this is very costly, often prohibitively so. For example, 
refusing to pay a bribe for admission to a hospital may lead to delays with fatal 
consequences.  
Figure 1 describes the harassment game. In stage 1, the official can opt 
out of bribe taking (𝐵 = 0) and provide the service to the citizen, or choose to 
specify a bribe amount (𝐵) to ask from the citizen. In stage 2, if the official asks 
for a bribe, then the citizen can choose any of the three actions: (1) refuse to pay 
the bribe, (2) pay quietly, or (3) pay and report the bribe. Actions (2) and (3) lead 
to a probabilistic discovery of bribery and the final payoffs in these two cases 
depend on whether the act was discovered or not. The act of bribery is more likely 
to be discovered if the citizen has reported the demand.  
We conduct two treatments with the above set-up. The treatments differ in 
the payoffs the players receive for their actions. First, in a symmetric liability 
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treatment, both citizen and official are fined if caught. This represents the legal 
status quo in most countries, including India where our study was conducted. In a 
contrasting asymmetric liability treatment, only the official gets prosecuted and 
pays a fine while the briber enjoys impunity and gets her bribe-money back. 
Clearly, in the latter case, the bribe-giver is no longer discouraged from reporting 
a bribe demand, and in fact has a strictly positive incentive to report. This, in turn, 
should deter the official from asking for bribes. 
To examine potential obstacles in the way to a successful implementation 
of the impunity scheme above we conduct two additional treatments. To address 
the concern about spiteful retaliation from the official’s side, the first of our 
additional treatments introduces retaliation in the asymmetric liability scenario; 
now officials who escape conviction even after being reported can retaliate and 
reduce the citizen’s payoff. In our game although retaliation is costly to the 
official, its mere availability might dissuade citizens from reporting bribe 
demands if they anticipate spiteful actions from the official. The second of our 
additional treatments addresses the practicality of bribe-returns to the citizen. We 
implement the asymmetric liability framework with bribes no longer returned, 
while officials continue to have the option of retaliating if conviction fails after 
whistle blowing. Since monetary incentives to report bribe demands are removed, 
this last treatment poses the toughest behavioural challenge to Basu’s proposal 
among the four situations.  
We next describe the four games (Symmetric, Asymmetric, Retaliation and 
No-Refund) in detail along with the payoffs and experiment parameters.  
SYMMETRIC 
Figure 1 presents the extensive form of the game. First, the official decides 
whether or not to demand a bribe. If he does not demand a bribe, the game ends 
and both players receive a payoff of 500 Indian rupees (Rs.). This outcome is the 
most efficient (in terms of joint payoff for the citizen and the official) and also 
equitable. Hence, it is salient that this is the socially preferred outcome.  
If the official asks for a bribe, he also needs to specify how much to ask 
for in multiples of Rs. 10 up to a maximum of Rs. 200.6 The citizen has three 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The upper bound on the bribe-ask cannot be determined independent of all other experimental 
parameters in our model. Once we choose all other parameters and the detection probabilities the 
upper bound on the bribe-ask turned out to be 200. 
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options: “Refuse to pay”, “Pay quietly”, or “Pay and report”. Refusing to pay the 
bribe is extremely costly for the citizen. In particular, the citizen’s payoff drops to 
Rs. 50, while the official retains 450 rupees, and the game ends. The decrease in 
the official’s payoff is motivated by detrimental effects that bribery has on social 
efficiency, which we wanted to capture in our design. Negative externalities have 
been previously captured in bribery experiments by imposing payoff reductions 
on other players in the lab (Abbink et al. 2002; Barr and Serra 2009; Cameron et 
al. 2009) or charities (Frank and Lambsdorff 2010). For our game, that did not 
seem appropriate since in contrast to collusive bribes, harassment bribes have no 
immediate effect on economic efficiency. If a service is delivered after a payment, 
then the bribe constitutes a mere redistribution from the citizen to the official. Yet 
we wanted to model the long-run detrimental effects of bribery, such as the loss of 
trust in good governance. Each act of bribery contributes to those damages, and 
everybody including those participating in bribery, suffers from them. We further 
wanted to keep the game as simple as possible, hence we chose this way of 
implementing the harmful effects of corruption.7 
If the citizen chooses to either pay quietly or pay and report the bribe, the 
game enters the next stage. Then a lottery determines whether the act of bribery is 
detected and fines are imposed. The probability of detection and prosecution 
depends on whether the citizen has reported the bribe exchange. If the citizen has 
paid quietly, then there is only a small chance that the act is discovered which we 
set to 5 percent. Paying and reporting increases this probability to 40 percent.8 
Note that even if a bribe payment is reported, detection and punishment are far 
from certain.  
If prosecuted, the fines that citizens have to pay are the only difference 
between the symmetric and subsequent asymmetric treatments. For the 
experiment to be meaningful, we needed to parameterise such that behavioural 
effects can show up in either direction in each treatment. We conjectured that a 
monetary fine of Rs. 250, leading to a final payoff of Rs. 200 for each player in 
case of prosecution, would achieve this. We chose the level of fine such that we 
expected it to be high enough to serve as a deterrent, and yet not so high that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Since our experiment is one-shot, simplicity is of particular value in our design.  
8 The probability of detection chosen is conservative but realistic as empirical estimates suggest 
that the fraction of reported bribe payments that leads to penalties is about 40% or slightly less in 
India (National Crime Records Bureau 2010). 
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expected payoffs become so trivial that no one would consider engaging in 
bribery.  
A simple backward induction analysis of the game suggests that the 
monetary incentives are such that the citizen faced with a bribe demand will 
always pay quietly. The official anticipates this and chooses his best response -
demand the maximum possible bribe.  
Figure 1. The game tree – treatments without retaliation 
 
ASYMMETRIC 
This treatment introduces the briber leniency approach proposed by Basu (2011), 
and differs from the symmetric treatment only in the treatment of the citizen in 
case of detection. Here, only the official is fined (the same amount as in the 
symmetric treatment).9 The citizen is not held responsible and the bribe she has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Basu (2011) originally proposed that the fines for the official be doubled to keep the overall fine 
the same. We did not implement this because it would have been difficult to separate effects of the 
leniency program from effects of the higher fine.  
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paid is returned to her. Consequently, monetary incentives change now in a way 
that the citizen would always like to report if she is asked for a bribe. The 
backward induction logic in turn predicts that officials will shy away from 
demanding bribes, since not asking for a bribe is his best response to the citizen’s 
“pay-and-report” choice. Hence, we should observe no bribes demanded in 
equilibrium. Figure 1 above summarises the extensive form of the above two 
treatments. 
RETALIATION 
The analysis above provides sufficient optimism on the deterrent effect of the 
leniency program, at least in theory. In reality, however, a relatively low 
conviction rate might discourage whistle-blowing considerably, especially if the 
citizen is apprehensive of further harassment from the official in the future. In this 
case, the prospect of getting the bribe back after successful prosecution must be 
weighed against potential retaliation if the prosecution is unsuccessful, leading to 
the official to remain in office. We consider such a situation in the retaliation 
treatment where the official has the option to be spiteful and reduce the citizen’s 
payoff if whistle blowing is unsuccessful. We assume though that the official 
needs to incur costs to do so. In particular, the official has to spend Rs. 50 to 
reduce the citizen’s final payoff by Rs. 150. This ratio (1:3) of cost to damages is 
consistent with previous experiments in which punishment options were studied 
(Gächter et al. 2008).  
Since it is costly, an official would never retaliate in the sub-game on the 
basis of monetary payoff gains alone. Hence, the theoretical money-maximising 
equilibrium prediction remains as before, no-bribery in equilibrium. A plethora of 
previous experiments however suggest that retaliation even if costly, is carried out 
often; sometimes to encourage socially desirable outcomes (Gächter et al. 2008), 
sometimes to enforce outcomes that are socially inefficient (Abbink et al. 2010). 
Hence, we conjecture that even though not a part of the sub-game perfect 
equilibrium, a behavioural threat of retaliation can be credible and possibly 
diffuse the deterrent effects of the leniency program.  
NO REFUND 
On paper, our fourth treatment provides the toughest challenge for Basu’s 
proposal. The theoretical analysis of the game relies heavily on monetary 
incentives offered to the citizen to come forward and report a bribe. In particular, 
the prospect of getting her bribe money back when the official is convicted 
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creates the positive incentive to self-report. However, this feature of Basu’s 
proposal has been criticised as rather naïve. In reality, bribers rarely get a receipt 
for their payment, so it will be hard enough to prove the corrupt act as such, let 
alone the exact amount that changed hands. Hence, in practice a leniency program 
is more likely to rely on the citizen’s intrinsic motivation to report a bribe. Such 
motivations can exist, and in fact a citizen who is sufficiently upset about the 
unfairness and immorality of the situation might be willing to report even without 
the incentive of material benefits.10 The victim can also consider taking action if 
she believes to be serving a greater societal benefit.11 
 
Figure 2. The game tree – treatments with retaliation 
The no-refund treatment allows us to examine whether the leniency policy 
can work in the absence of monetary incentives. The treatment differs from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10  See for example, citizen efforts in reporting bribes in India through the web portal 
www.ipaidabribe.com.  11 In that case, one might even envision a situation where monetary incentives for whistle-blowers 
would prove to be counterproductive if such extrinsic motivations have a tendency to crowd out 
intrinsic motivations (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997).  
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retaliation treatment only in the payoff for the citizen in case of the successful 
prosecution of the official. We introduce payoffs for the citizen such that it is not 
strictly better for the citizen to report a bribe as she does not get back the bribe 
even if whistle blowing turns out to be successful. The equilibrium prediction is 
now indeterminate. The citizen is indifferent between paying quietly and 
reporting the bribe payment. 12As a result, multiple sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibria are possible, and behaviour in the experiment can offer some insight on 
preferred equilibrium behaviour. Figure 2 describes the extensive form of the 
above two treatments.13 Table 1 summarises the design features and predictions of 
the four treatments.  
 
3. Procedure 
All experimental sessions were conducted in Hyderabad, India, with 
undergraduate and graduate (Masters) students. Three hundred and sixty 
subjects participated in the experiment. Subjects were recruited by sending email 
invitations to the student association listservs in each of three prominent institutes 
in the city - BITS Pilani’s Hyderabad Campus, NALSAR Law University and the 
University of Hyderabad. We selected these institutions since they enrol students 
from all over India allowing us to recruit a subject group with a range of 
backgrounds. All four treatments were conducted in each institution. Each subject 
participated in only one of the treatments. 
 None of the institutions has had economic experiments before, so 
contamination from one session to another was a potential concern. Since 
anonymous recruiting systems were not in place, participants in later sessions 
could potentially be influenced by what they heard from participants in earlier 
sessions. To rule out such effects, the experiment was conducted in a single 
afternoon at each location. We held two large sessions with 60 subjects back-to-
back, with the second session starting while the participants of the first session 
were still in the classroom. All subjects first met in a large lecture theatre and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 It may even be costly for the citizen to report, in which case the citizen would have a strict 
incentive not to report. We abstracted from such costs, assuming a situation where reporting 
facilities are put in place that make reporting costs trivial. Our goal was to study the effectiveness 
of leniency out of pure intrinsic motivation, where there are no incentives for or against reporting. 
13 While several alternative policy treatments would be interesting to examine, we restricted our 
attention to scenarios that are currently being considered in the field and ones that are more 
externally valid.  
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were given general instructions. They were then divided into two groups of 30 
subjects and led to one of two classrooms where we had prepared visual 
separation between the desks. The two groups participated in different treatments, 
which we conducted simultaneously. Detailed instructions were given by an 
instructor and to avoid possible experimenter effects, which might stem from the 
inevitable use of different instructors for the different groups, we made sure that 
the assignment of instructors to treatments was as balanced as possible.   
Subjects within each group were randomly assigned to the role of an 
official or a citizen. The experimenter read the instructions aloud. Our objective 
was to simulate the context of a corrupt transaction and evoke associated 
emotional and moral responses. Therefore, we used in-context language 
consistently throughout the instructions (see the experimental instructions in the 
appendix). Barr and Serra (2009) find that bribes are less likely to be offered and 
accepted in the laboratory when the experimental instructions explicitly describe a 
bribery scenario instead of a more abstract description.14 Consequently, we can 
claim that if decisions were instead made under a more abstract description or 
under a greater social distance, then our experiment results can be looked upon as 
setting the lower bounds of corrupt behaviour. The use of context-specific 
instructions also improves the external validity of our results. Furthermore, we 
used real currency in the experiments ensuring that participants could comprehend 
and relate to the decision making more easily.  
Subjects were asked to fill in their decision sheet where they made 
decisions for every situation in which they could be during the game. We chose to 
elicit complete strategies for two reasons. First, this method allows us to gather 
decisions for all possible decision nodes, including those that are not reached in 
the realised play. This increases data-effectiveness dramatically. Second, strategy 
elicitation compresses the multi-stage game into one with a single simultaneous 
move for each player. Our time-constrained setting did not allow us to shift 
decisions back and forth between the players.15 
After the experiment was over, subjects completed a survey questionnaire 
first before collecting their experiment earnings. To compute earnings, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006) and Krajcova and Ortmann (2008) however find no 
significant differences between neutral and bribery frames. 
15 Brandts and Charness (2009) survey experiments that have been conducted with both strategy 
elicitation and spontaneous play. While magnitude effects can sometimes be found, no study 
reports that treatment comparisons would be affected. 
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decision sheet for each official was randomly matched with a citizen who 
participated in the same treatment at the same location. Based on the decisions of 
each player, the payoffs were calculated and distributed to participants in a sealed 
envelope. The subjects earned an average of Rs. 493. At the time of the 
experiment, the exchange rate to other major currencies was approximately 1.95 
US dollars, 1.54 euro and 12.50 Chinese yuan for 100 Indian rupees. 
 
Table 1. Treatments 
Treatment Description Predicted bribe demands 
   
1. Symmetric Official and Citizen both 
liable and pay penalty; bribe 
not refunded. 
100% 
   
2. Asymmetric Only Official liable and pays 
penalty; bribe refunded. 
0% 
   
   
3. Retaliation Only Official liable and pays 
penalty; bribe refunded; 
Official can retaliate. 
0% 
   
4. No Refund Only Official liable and pays 
penalty; bribe not refunded; 
Official can retaliate. 
Indeterminate 
   
 	  
4. Results 
4.1 Survey Results 
We find that even though our subjects were relatively young (average age of 22 
years), 55% admitted to paying a bribe to obtain household services such as 
electricity, water or a telephone connection, financial services in a bank, post 
office, insurance company or transport office and educational services at a school 
or college. Additionally, participants seemed to be well aware of anti-corruption 
laws in India, with 63% reporting “If caught, both the bribe giver and taker are 
committing an illegal act”. They also report feeling uneasy about bribery, with 
only 22% supporting the statement “Do you think that it is useful to have a system 
where there is a way to get what you want even if you have to bribe”. The data 
from the survey indicates that the subject pool was reasonably informed, had 
some exposure to corruption and had views and concerns about it, enabling an 
accurate examination of the effectiveness of different corruption policies. Note 
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that subjects answered these questions at the end of the experiment after all 
experiment decisions had been made. 
 
 
4.2 Experimental Results 
We organise our results below in terms of the two players and their behaviour.  
Citizens’ actions are reported first, since leniency proposals are directly aimed at 
changing their behaviour. Officials’ anticipatory behaviour is reported next. Table 
1 provides an overview of the treatments, along with the predicted equilibrium 
behaviour of officials. 
Figure 3. Citizens’ decisions – all bribe offers 
Do Citizens report under impunity? 
Figures 3 and 4 show the percentage of subjects who “Pay and report”, “Pay 
quietly” and “Refuse to pay”, respectively, in each of the four treatments. We find 
that consistent with Basu’s conjecture, the percentage of citizens who pay and 
then report the bribe-demand jumps from 25% to 59% under the asymmetric 
liability policy (a Mann-Whitney test rejects the null of equal means with p-

















perceptible change in the percentage of subjects who refuse to pay the bribe (see 
Figure 4). Rather it is caused by the decrease in the percentage of citizens who 
pay quietly (58% to 19%). 
The increase in reporting behaviour however, goes down significantly from the 
asymmetric to the no-refund treatment where officials are allowed to retaliate and 
strict financial incentives from reporting are removed (a Mann-Whitney test 
rejects the null of equal means with p-value=0.01). In fact, we find that the 
average percentage of citizens “paying and reporting” slides back towards the 
mean of the symmetric treatment (a Mann-Whitney test fails to reject the null of 
equal means with p-value=0.65). These results suggest that allowing the 
possibility of retaliation by officials deters citizens’ reporting behaviour.  
Figure 4. Citizens’ decisions conditional on bribe demanded 
 
Further, an examination of the distribution of bribe demands suggests that 
irrespective of the treatment, citizens make their choices contingent on the 
officials’ bribe demand amounts – higher bribe demands are typically met with a 
“pay and report” while smaller bribe demands are often paid and not reported. 
Figure 4 describes the subject behaviour in the four treatments. 
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To investigate citizens’ behaviour in more detail, we estimate a 
multinomial logit model where citizens’ choices are a function of the amount of 
bribe demanded, controlling for the education institutions as well as some of the 
demographic characteristics of the participants. Results of this estimation are 
reported in Table 2. We find that irrespective of the treatment, a one-rupee 
increase in the bribe-demand significantly decreases the relative-risk-ratio of 
being in the “pay quietly” group compared to being in the base comparison group 
of “pay and report”. For example, in the symmetric treatment, a rupee increase in 
the bribe-ask leads to a decrease in the relative risk of the subject being in the 
“pay quietly” group compared to the “pay and report” group by a factor of 0.995 
(see row 1 and column 3 of Table 2), and similarly for all the other three 
treatments.  
Table 2: Multinomial logit estimates of citizen decisions 
Notes: RRR is Relative risk ratio. “Pay and report” is the base outcome from the dependent 
variables. “BITS” is the omitted category from the independent variables. Standard errors 
clustered by participant. ***p<0.01.  
 
The results confirm our observation that across treatments, as the size of 
the bribe demand increases it is more likely to be reported. Put alternatively, a 
 Refuse to pay  Pay quietly 
 RRR Std. Err.   RRR Std. Err. 
Bribe amount in symmetric treatment 1.000 0.002  0.995*** 0.002 
Bribe amount in asymmetric treatment 0.996 0.002  0.977*** 0.003 
Bribe amount in retaliation treatment 0.999 0.002  0.989*** 0.002 
Bribe amount in no refund treatment 1.000 0.002  0.992*** 0.002 
NALSAR 1.371 0.507  0.876 0.214 
University of Hyderabad 4.244*** 1.42  0.974 0.261 
Hindu 1.306 0.540  1.144 0.306 
Scheduled Caste 0.817 0.345  1.072 0.345 
Male 1.113 0.332  1.373 0.300 
Chi-square test for mean treatment differences when choice = Refuse to pay 
(Bribe amount in) symmetric treatment = asymmetric treatment   p-value = 0.18 
(Bribe amount in) asymmetric treatment = retaliation treatment 
(Bribe amount in) retaliation treatment = no-refund treatment   
p-value = 0.35 
p-value = 0.64 
Chi-square test for mean treatment differences when choice = Pay quietly 
(Bribe amount in) symmetric treatment = asymmetric treatment   p-value = 0.00 
(Bribe amount in) asymmetric treatment = retaliation treatment   p-value = 0.00 
(Bribe amount in) retaliation treatment = no-refund treatment    p-value =0.26  
Pseudo R sqr.    0.102  
Number of observations    3571  
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small amount of bribe demand is less likely to be reported. The latter observation 
reveals that subject behaviour seems to indicate an established norm amongst the 
subject population where a large bribe demand is considered to be unfair, while a 
small bribe demand is acceptable and does not violate subjects’ fairness 
perceptions. Consequently, we observe an element of reciprocity in citizens’ 
choices where high bribe demands may be seen as unkind and trigger reporting. 
This is also observed in the symmetric treatment where reporting bribe demand is 
actually costly for the citizen. In contrast, low demands are possibly perceived as 
a relatively kind act from the official, and tolerated even in the asymmetric 
treatment where the subject has only to gain monetarily should she decide to 
report. 
The pairwise mean tests of treatment differences in Table 2 show that for 
the “pay quietly” option, behaviour is significantly different across treatments for 
the first two comparisons, but not for the comparison between the retaliation and 
no-refund treatment. These tests also indicate that consistent with Figure 4, the 
percentage of subjects who “refuse to pay” remain unaltered across treatments. 
This suggests that at least in our experiment, citizens on an average do not change 
their behaviour due to the introduction of leniency programs that might signal 
moral acceptability.  
 
Do officials demand fewer bribes? 
We next examine whether giving immunity to citizens induces any anticipatory 
change in bribe demands by officials. Recall that Basu’s hypothesis was that the 
asymmetric liability ought to not only change citizens’ behaviour, but also 
discipline officials’ bribe demands. Accordingly, the backward induction analysis 
in our asymmetric and retaliation games predicts that in the unique sub-game 
perfect Nash equilibrium, officials do not demand any bribes. Overall, in our 
experiment the officials seem to show a weaker response to variations across 
treatments compared to citizens. One possibility is that they might not be thinking 
in a backwardly inductive manner. Officials might also face an additional level of 
strategic uncertainty compared to citizens, as they have to foresee the citizens’ 
response while citizens can condition their choice on the official’s demand. This 
additional level of uncertainty can possibly dilute some of the treatment effects. 
Figure 5 shows a clear tendency towards reduction in bribe demands by 
officials. We find that the percentage of officials who demand bribe drops from 
38% in the symmetric liability situation to 24% in the asymmetric liability 
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situation (a Mann-Whitney test rejects the null of equal means with p-value=0.08). 
The average bribe amount demanded by the officials also goes down from Rs. 152 
to Rs. 135 rupees, although this is not statistically significant.16 The drop stems 
from fewer bribe demands, not the amount that is asked for. Figure 5 describes the 
average bribes asked in each treatment, here conditional on there being a positive 
bribe demand. These averages are very similar across all treatments and no 
difference is statistically significant. One might hypothesise that officials may try 
to compensate for the higher risk of being reported under asymmetric liability by 
demanding higher bribes, but our data do not provide any indication for this.  
When officials are allowed to retaliate, 44% chose to pay money (Rs. 50) 
to reduce the citizen’s payoff (by Rs. 150) in the retaliation treatment and 33% in 
the no-refund treatment (this difference is not statistically significant). The 
proportion of officials demanding bribes increases as anticipated. In fact, 
behaviour in the retaliation and no-refund treatments suggests that the disciplinary 
effects of briber impunity dissipate away considerably for officials. Figure 5 
shows that 38% and 27% of officials demand bribes in the two treatments. The 
average amount of bribes demanded are Rs. 149 and Rs. 148 respectively, lower 
than in the symmetric treatment but higher than the asymmetric treatment.  
 
Figure 5. Officials’ behaviour  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Despite the high bribe amount, the overall level of bribes is low, with at least 62% of officials 
not demanding bribes. This might indicate either aversion to corruption or risk aversion. 



















Average	  amount	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conditional	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  demand
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Table 3: Probit estimates of Official behaviour 
Notes: “Asymmetric” treatment, “Female” and “BITS” are the omitted categories from the 
independent variables. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Specification includes a 
religion dummy along with a set of interaction dummies between treatment dummies and the 
religion dummy. These are not reported here for ease of exposition. **p<0.05 and ***p<0.01. 
 
We next report results from a probit regression with robust standard errors 
(see Table 3) that examine the determinants of official behaviour, controlling for 
variables from our post-experiment survey. 17  Results confirm our earlier 
observation that asymmetric liability decreases bribe demand compared to the 
baseline situation of symmetric liability. Interestingly, we find that subjects who 
report that they are agreeable to giving bribes on the post-experiment survey are 
significantly more likely to ask for bribes. Also, male subjects seem to ask for 
more bribes than female students, a finding consistent with previous experimental 
findings (Alatas et al. 2009; Frank, Lambsdorff and Boehm 2011) as well as other 
empirical findings (Lambsdorff and Fink 2006). Chi-square tests for mean 
differences in treatments indicate further that official’s behaviour is only 
marginally different between the symmetric and the retaliation treatment; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 In our specification we included controls for religion (Hindu or non-Hindu), as well as 
interaction terms of the religion dummy with the treatment. Although our results seem to suggest 
that Hindus ask for bribes significantly more often, we realise that our total sample is relatively 
small (49 out of 147 Hindus ask for a bribe in all the four treatments together, and 8 out of 33 non-
Hindus ask for a bribe in all the four treatments together) to convincingly conclude whether 
religion affects the propensity to engage in bribe-taking behaviour. Accordingly, we have not 
reported the dummies related to religion and its interaction with the treatments. 
   Bribe demand 
Coefficient (S.E.) 
    
Symmetric treatment   2.27***  (0.94) 
Retaliation Treatment   0.90  (0.75) 
No refund treatment   -0.02  (0.85) 
Nalsar   -0.42  (0.26) 
University of Hyderabad   -0.50  (0.32) 
Male   0.46**  (0.23) 
Scheduled caste   0.25  (0.33) 
Income (in thousands)   0.001  (0.003) 
Agreeable to giving bribes   0.64***  (0.23) 
Age   0.055  (0.06)  
    
Chi-square test for mean treatment differences 
Symmetric = Retaliation   p-value = 0.09 
Retaliation = No Refund    p-value = 0.21 
Symmetric = No refund   p-value = 0.01 
 
Pseudo R sqr.   0.11 
Number of observations   180 
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official’s behaviour is also not significantly different between the retaliation and 
the no-refund treatments.  
Between the symmetric and the no-refund treatment, there are three 
features that are different; namely, addition of the asymmetric liability, official’s 
ability to retaliate, and removal of strict monetary incentives for the citizens. 
Therefore, we cannot discern causality in the difference in officials’ behaviour 
between the two treatments. However, the chi-square tests of mean differences 
establish that officials demand significantly lower bribes compared to the 
symmetric treatment. We infer from this result that even in the strongest test of 
Basu’s policy, the disciplinary effect remains present. 
 
 
Figure 6. Expected official payoff conditional on bribe demand 
 
The question arises whether asymmetric liability affects the profitability of 
bribe demands. Since we elicited complete strategies from the citizens, we can 
calculate the expected empirical payoff from each bribe level. The results are 
depicted in Figure 7, not including money officials may spend on retaliation. It 


















































the citizens’ higher propensity to report high bribes does not compensate for the 
extra income generated by them. In three of the four treatments the most 
profitable strategy for officials is to demand the maximum bribe. Only in the 
asymmetric treatment without retaliation expected payoffs for all bribe levels 
remain below the payoff of Rs. 500 that an official obtains if he does not demand 
a bribe. Note, however, that this payoff is sure, while payoffs after demanding a 
bribe are uncertain. For risk-averse officials not demanding a bribe may still be an 




Motivated by Basu’s (2011) policy proposal of providing legal immunity to bribe-
givers in the case of harassment bribes and the ensuing debate, we evaluate the 
effectiveness of an asymmetric liability policy using laboratory experiments. We 
incorporate two extensions to the basic policy prescription by Basu to provide 
behavioural evidence on the effectiveness of the policy when bribe-takers have 
the option to retaliate on whistle-blowers if the prosecution is not successful, and 
the impact of non-monetary incentives in reporting bribe demands. 
We find that compared to symmetric liability, allowing legal immunity to 
the bribe-givers increases reporting of bribe-demands and reduces the demand for 
bribes. We also find that a substantial minority of citizens refuse to pay bribes, 
across treatments despite significant monetary costs of doing so. This is not 
surprising, since refusals to pay may be driven more by principles rather than 
incentives. An implication of this is that Basu’s proposal does not change the 
moral authority of the law on citizens’ behaviour and consequently the proposed 
change in the liability does not have to be interpreted as a “licence to bribe”.  
Comparing behaviour in the retaliation and no-refund treatments shows 
that strict financial incentives do not necessarily drive reporting behaviour. Non-
monetary factors can motivate reporting behaviour as well This could be 
beneficial in the field as often monetary incentives (such as return of the bribe 
money) are difficult to operationalize.  
Analysis of officials’ behaviour suggests that significant challenges to 
implementing Basu’s proposal emerge when officials are able to retaliate against 
citizens who report bribe demands. We find that in such situations, both bribe 
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demands and reporting return closer to the original levels of the symmetric 
liability case.  
 Our finding suggests that Basu’s proposal should be implemented along 
with complementary measures such as policies to rotate officials in different posts 
to mitigate the effectiveness of retaliation against citizens who report bribe 
demands (see, for example, Abbink, 2004). In addition, to protect citizens’ 
vulnerability, whistle blowers may need to be given protection such as anonymity 
for reporters. Finally, policymakers could aim to increase the probability of 
successful prosecution after whistle blowing. 
We conclude that bolstering the institutional set-up is important to realise 
the full benefits of this leniency policy. Basu’s policy proposal can be a credible 
step towards fighting harassment bribes as long as care is taken to introduce 
additional measures that reduce the power of officials, improve the protection of 
whistle blowers and promote better prosecution of the accused. 
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Appendix 
 The experimental Instructions 
(For the Retaliation treatment, other treatments are analogous) 
Player No. _________ 
You have been randomly assigned the role of Citizen/Official in today’s experiment. 
General 
Welcome to today’s economics experiment. This is an experiment in decision making which will provide you an 
opportunity to earn money. The amount of money you earn depends on your decisions and a randomly matched 
participant’s decisions in the experiment. Your earnings in the experiment will be paid to you in cash privately, at 
the end of the experiment. Please do not talk to each other during the experiment.  
In the experiment you will be matched with another player in the room for the rest of the experiment. You will not 
know who you are matched with, either during or after the experiment. You and the matched player will be 
presented with an economic decision-making situation that resembles a real-life situation. One of you will be 
randomly assigned a role as a Government Official, and the other as a Citizen. You will be provided with a Personal 
Record Sheet that will state the role you have been assigned in the experiment.  
Overview of the Experiment 
In this experiment, the Official can decide to ask the Citizen for a bribe or can decide not to ask the citizen for a 
bribe.  
If the Official decides to ask for a bribe, then the Official has to choose the amount he wants as bribe from the 
Citizen. The Citizen then has three options. S/he can refuse to pay the bribe, pay the bribe, or pay the bribe and 
report the bribe demand. Reporting the bribe makes it much more likely that the Official is caught and fined.  
If the Citizen has reported the bribe, but the authorities have not found sufficient evidence to fine the Official, then 
the game moves to another stage, in which the Official can reduce the Citizen’s income by incurring a cost. 
Though the game has up to three stages in which one player needs to make a decision, everybody needs to fill in the 
decision sheet only once. You will make decisions for every situation in which you can be during the game. We will 
then collect your decision sheets and pay you according to your decision and the decisions of the other participant 
you are matched with. 
Attached is a Figure which summarizes the structure of the experiment. The sheet labelled “Questions” provides 
some examples that might help you in understanding the payoffs associated with different decisions. However, 
before looking at the examples, let us first look at the detailed instructions for each participant. 
 
Detailed Instructions for Officials 
If you are assigned the role of the Official in today’s experiment, you have to first decide whether to ask the Citizen 
for a bribe or not. If you decide not to ask for a bribe, then you get Rs. 500, and the Citizen gets Rs. 500.  
If instead, you decide to ask for a bribe, you have to decide how much to ask for. You can ask any amount (B) 
between 10 and 200 in multiples of Rs. 10.  
The Citizen decides whether or not to refuse to pay the bribe, or to pay the bribe without reporting, or to pay the 
bribe and report your bribe demand. Reporting determines the probability with which you are fined. If the Citizen 
does not report the bribe, then the probability of you being fined is 5%. If the Citizen reports the bribe, then this 
probability increases to 40%.  
Turn over 
After the Citizen has decided, a random draw determines whether there is sufficient evidence that you are fined. If 
there is not sufficient evidence, then you receive Rs. 450 plus the bribe you have asked for. The Citizen receives Rs. 
450 less the bribe s/he has paid to you. If there is sufficient evidence, then you receive a fine and you must return the 
bribe and in addition pay a fine. Your payoff after this stage is then Rs. 200. The Citizen gets the bribe back; hence 
his/her payoff is Rs. 450. 
If the Citizen has reported the bribe, but there has not been sufficient evidence, then the game enters a third decision 
stage. You can spend Rs. 50 from your final earnings to reduce the Citizen’s payoff by Rs. 150; in that case, you 
will receive as your final payments Rs. 400 plus the amount of bribe you had asked for earlier; the Citizen will end 
up receiving Rs. 300 less the amount of bribe s/he paid to you. If you choose not to reduce the Citizen’s payoff, then 
the final payoffs are the payoffs after stage 2: You receive Rs. 450 plus the bribe, the Citizen receives Rs. 450 less 
the bribe. 
As an Official you make decisions at up to two stages. In the beginning you decide on whether you ask for a bribe 
and if so, how much you demand. If you decide to ask for a bribe, then it is possible that you need to make another 
decision at the third stage. In case that the Citizen reports the bribe but you do not get fined you can choose whether 
or not to reduce the Citizen’s payoff. We ask you to make this decision already in the beginning. It is possible that 
your decision for the third stage is not carried out, depending on the decisions of the Citizen and the outcome of the 
random draw. We nevertheless ask you to make a decision for this case beforehand, such that we do not need to 
return the decision sheet to you until the game is completed. 
Detailed Instructions for Citizens 
If you are randomly assigned the role of the Citizen in today’s experiment, it will be the Official who makes a 
decision first and you respond to it. First the Official decides whether or not to ask for a bribe. If s/he does not ask 
for a bribe, then you get Rs. 500, and the Official gets Rs. 500.  
If instead, the Official decides to ask for a bribe, you are told how much the Official asks for.  
If the Official asks for a bribe, you have the following options. First, you can refuse to pay the bribe. In this case the 
game ends and your payoff is Rs. 50; the Official’s payoff is Rs. 450. If you decide to pay the bribe, you can decide 
whether or not to report the Official’s bribe demand. Your decision to report determines the probability with which 
the Official is fined. If you do not report the bribe, then the probability of the Official being fined is 5%. If you 
report the bribe, then this probability increases to 40%.  
After you have decided to pay the bribe, a random draw determines whether there is sufficient evidence that the 
Official is fined. If there is not sufficient evidence, then you receive Rs. 450 minus the bribe you paid out. The 
Official receives Rs. 450 plus the bribe you have paid to him/her. If there is sufficient evidence, then you get back 
the bribe you have paid and your payoff after this stage is Rs. 450. The Official receives a fine, his/her payoff after 
this stage is then Rs. 200.  
If you have reported the bribe, but there has not been sufficient evidence, then the game enters a third decision stage. 
The Official can spend Rs. 50 from his/her final earnings to reduce your payoff by Rs. 150; in that case, you will 
receive as your final payments Rs. 300 less the amount of bribe you paid to the Official. The Official receives Rs. 
400 plus the amount of bribe you have paid to him/her. If the Official chooses not to reduce your payoff, then the 
final payoffs are the payoffs after stage 2: You receive Rs. 450 less the bribe, the Official receives Rs. 450 plus the 
bribe.  
As a Citizen you make decisions at the second stage, after the Official has decided on the bribe demand. The 
Official can either not demand a bribe, in which case you do not make a decision. If the Official demands a bribe, 
s/he can ask for twenty different amounts of bribe from 10 to 200 (in steps of 10). We ask you to make a decision for 
each bribe amount asked from you beforehand. Your decision sheet comprises a table with all twenty possible 
amounts. For each amount you tick a box whether you want to refuse to pay the bribe, pay without reporting, or pay 
and report the bribe demand if the Official demands this amount. We will then collect the Official’s decision sheets 
together with yours, and carry out the decision you specified for the amount the Official has chosen (if any). 	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Control Questions  
(These questions aim to help you understand the experiment better and should not be used as a 
guide for decision-making in the experiment.)  
 
1. Assume that the Official asks for a bribe of Rs. 150. Suppose that the Citizen he is matched 
with decides to report the bribe and the Official is caught and fined. What will be the earnings of 
the Official and the Citizen in this group? 
 a. Official: Rs 
 b. Citizen: Rs 
  
 
2. Suppose that the Official asks for a bribe of Rs. 80. The Citizen reports the bribe demand. The 
Official is not caught however and he decides to spend Rs. 50 to reduce the payoffs of the 
Citizen. What will be the earnings of the Official and the Citizen in this group? 
   a. Official: Rs 
 b. Citizen: Rs 
 
 
3. What will be the earnings of the Official and the Citizen in the group, if the Official does not 
ask for a bribe? 
   a. Official: Rs 
 b. Citizen: Rs 
 
4. Suppose that the Official asks for a bribe of Rs. 200. The Citizen does not report the bribe 
demand. The Official is not caught. What will be the earnings of the Official and the Citizen in 
this group? 
   a. Official: Rs 
 b. Citizen: Rs 
 
  
5. Suppose that the Official asks for a bribe of Rs. 100. The Citizen refuses to give the bribe. 
What will be the earnings of the Official and the Citizen in this group? 
   a. Official: Rs 





Post-Experiment Survey 	  Player	  Number:	  __________	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Instructions:	  Please	  answer	  ALL	  of	  the	  questions	  on	  this	  survey	  as	  accurately	  as	  you	  can.	  All	  responses	   will	   be	   kept	   confidential	   by	   the	   researchers	   and	   will	   not	   be	   revealed	   to	   any	  authorities	  within	  the	  university	  or	  outside.	  Leave	  blank	  if	  you	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  answer.	  	  1. What	  is	  your	  date	  of	  birth?	  	  Month:	  ___________	  Year:	  __________	  	  2. What	  is	  your	  gender?	  
€ Male	  	  	  	  	  	  €	  Female	  	  3. What	  is	  your	  religion?	  
€ Hindu	  	  
€ Muslim	  	  
€ Christian	  	  
€ Sikh	  	  
€ Other	  (Please	  specify__________________)	  
€ Don’t	  know	  	  4. What	  is	  your	  caste?	  
€ Scheduled	  caste	  
€ Scheduled	  tribe	  
€ Other	  backward	  classes	  
€ Upper	  caste	  
€ Other	  (Please	  specify	  _________________)	  
€ Don’t	  know	  	  5. What	  is	  your	  program	  and	  year	  of	  study	  at	  the	  University	  or	  Institute?	  (Mark	  only	  one	  )	  
€ Bachelor’s	  student	  (BA,	  BSc,	  BE,	  etc.)	  
• Circle	  Year	  1/2/3/4/5	  
€ Master’s	  student	  (MPhil,	  MA,	  MSc,	  MTech,	  MBA,	  LLB	  etc.)	  
• Circle	  Year	  1/2/3/4/5	  
€ Other	  (Please	  specify	  _________________	  )	  	  6. What	  is	  your	  field	  of	  study	  (specialization)	  in	  the	  program?	  ______________________________	  	  7. Last	  year,	  what	  were	  your	  average	  marks/	  grades	  in	  the	  program?	  _____	  out	  of	  _________	  	  	  8. How	  much	  work	  experience	  do	  you	  have?	  (Mark	  all	  that	  apply)	  
€ None	  
€ Internship	  __________	  months.	  Employer(s):_________________________	  
€ Full-­‐time	  work	  __________	  years.	  Employer(s):_________________________	  	  9. In	  the	  last	  year,	  how	  much	  did	  you	  earn?	  Include	  all	  sources.	  Rs.	  ______________	  	  10. What	  were	  the	  source(s)	  of	  this	  income?	  (Mark	  all	  that	  apply)	  
€ Employment	  (part	  time/	  full	  time	  job)	  
€ Allowance	  from	  family	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€ Scholarships	  
€ Other	  (Please	  specify	  _________________	  )	  	  11. How	  do	  you	  most	  hear	  about	  corrupt	  behaviour?	  (Mark	  only	  one)	  
  Through	  personal	  experience.	  
  Through	  the	  experiences	  of	  family	  or	  friends	  
  By	  reading	  magazines	  or	  the	  newspaper	  
  By	  listening	  to	  the	  news	  on	  TV	  or	  radio	  
  Through	  an	  academic	  course	  
  Other	  (Please	  specify	  _________	  ________)	  	  12. In	  what	  context	  do	  you	  most	  hear	  about	  corrupt	  behaviour?	  (Mark	  only	  one)	  
  Corruption	  scandals	  involving	  politicians	  and	  bureaucrats	  
  Corruption	  scandals	  involving	  companies	  and	  rich	  individuals	  
  Harassment	  of	  ordinary	  people	  for	  basic	  services	  
  Other	  (Please	  specify	  _________________	  )	  	  13. In	  what	  context	  do	  you	  most	  experience	  corrupt	  behaviour?	  (Mark	  only	  one)	  
  I	  receive	  poorer	  quality	  public	  infrastructure	  because	  of	  corruption	  	  
  Other	  people	  get	  ahead	  in	  education	  and	  career	  because	  of	  corruption	  
  I	  have	  to	  give	  bribes	  frequently	  for	  basic	  government	  services	  
  I	  have	  to	  give	  bribes	  frequently	  for	  services	  by	  private	  service	  providers	  
  I	  have	  to	  give	  bribes	  occasionally	  for	  basic	  government	  services	  
  I	  have	  to	  give	  bribes	  occasionally	  for	  services	  by	  private	  service	  providers	  
  Other	  (Please	  specify	  ________________	  )	  	  14. In	  which	  contexts	  have	  you	  ever	  given	  a	  bribe?	  (Mark	  all	  that	  apply)	  
  To	  get	  household	  services	  such	  as	  electricity,	  water	  or	  telephone	  connection	  
  To	  get	  services	  in	  a	  bank,	  post	  office,	  insurance	  company	  or	  transport	  office	  
  To	  get	  educational	  services	  at	  a	  school,	  college	  or	  for	  a	  scholarship	  
  Other	  (Please	  specify	  _________________	  )	  
  I	  have	  never	  given	  a	  bribe	  	  15. Which	  of	  the	  following	  best	  describes	  the	  anti-­‐corruption	  law	  in	  India?	  (Mark	  only	  one)	  
  If	  caught,	  both	  the	  bribe	  giver	  and	  taker	  are	  committing	  an	  illegal	  act	  
  If	  caught,	  the	  bribe	  taker	  is	  committing	  an	  illegal	  act,	  but	  the	  bribe	  giver	  is	  not	  responsible	  
  If	  caught,	  the	  bribe	  giver	  is	  committing	  an	  illegal	  act,	  but	  the	  bribe	  taker	  is	  not	  responsible	  
  If	  caught,	  neither	  the	  bribe	  giver	  nor	  taker	  are	  committing	  an	  illegal	  act	  
  I	  don’t	  know	  anything	  about	  the	  anti-­‐corruption	  law	  in	  India	  	  16. Do	  you	  think	  that	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  have	  a	  system	  where	  there	  is	  a	  way	  to	  get	  what	  you	  want	  even	  if	  you	  have	  to	  bribe?	  (Mark	  only	  one)	  
  Yes	  
  No	  
  Don’t	  know	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  17. In	  which	  of	  the	  following	  situations	  have	  you	  jumped	  or	  cut	  a	  queue?	  (Mark	  all	  that	  apply)	  
€ While	  waiting	  to	  buy	  a	  ticket	  
€ Boarding	  a	  bus	  
€ Boarding	  a	  train	  
€ In	  government	  offices	  
€ Waiting	  at	  the	  bank	  teller	  
 
